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In 1989, the massive Panguna copper mine, 
which was at the centre of a decade-long conflict 
in Bougainville, was forced to close. Twenty-five 
years on, Bougainville is readying for a deferred 
referendum on independence — one of the central 
pillars of the Bougainville Peace Agreement — to 
be held sometime between 2015 and 2020. As the 
territory contemplates its political future, and how 
it will generate the revenue needed to support 
either meaningful autonomy or an independent 
state, the possibility of reopening the Panguna 
mine is prominent on the political agenda. Three 
of the options being considered are: 1) The mine 
never opens again; 2) The mine opens again under 
Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL); 3) The mine 
opens again under control of some other company. 
This In Brief focuses on one of these possibilities: 
reopening the mine under BCL. In particular, it 
discusses a variety of local expectations in relation 
to material and symbolic reparations that face BCL, 
operator of the closed mine, if it were to resume 
operations in Bougainville. 
Consultations on a Return to Panguna
To gauge local support for the resumption of min-
ing at Panguna, the Autonomous Bougainville Gov-
ernment (ABG) and the Papua New Guinea Gov-
ernment agreed in 2008 that the 1967 Bougainville 
Copper Agreement (BCA) should be reviewed. 
As the agreement has not been reviewed since the 
1970s, landowners and the Bougainville Govern-
ment have been left with uncertainty on a number 
of important issues such as the availability of reve-
nues from Panguna in the future, and responsibility 
for stabilising the mine site if it is never to reopen. 
But by 2010, all parties agreed that if Panguna 
were ever to reopen, it would require not just a 
review of the BCA, but an entirely new agreement. 
This was based on a view expressed in public 
consultations that it would be unacceptable ‘for 
the first Bougainville mining law to give any 
form of recognition to the BCA, or to any mining 
exploration or development licences granted to 
BCL under the grossly unfair colonial mining law 
operating in the 1960[s]’ (Regan 2014:90). When 
the ABG passed the August 2014 Bougainville 
Mining (Transitional Arrangements) Bill, BCL was 
stripped of all lasting tenements, instead vesting it 
with an exploration license over its former Special 
Mining Lease. In response, Rio Tinto, majority 
(53.83 per cent) shareholder in BCL, announced a 
review of its investment in BCL. 
In spite of uncertainty about Rio Tinto’s 
involvement, there has been ongoing engagement 
of ABG and landowner leaders with BCL since July 
2012 about a potential return to mining at Panguna 
under BCL. This interest is based on the belief that 
‘better the devil you know’, implying that BCL is 
open to righting previous wrongs by adhering to 
social and environmental best practice — some-
thing, it is feared, a new company may not. Under-
lying this seeming openness to BCL is also a trust 
that the company has learned from its mistakes, 
and, as a consequence, would be more committed 
to protecting the rights of landowners and their 
environment in the future. 
Support for BCL and large-scale mining, how-
ever, is far from universal. There are significant 
fears that reopening the mine could jeopardise Bou-
gainville’s peace process and lead to a resurgence of 
the social and environmental problems that plagued 
Bougainville during the operating years of the mine. 
The inclusivity of the ABG’s landowner consulta-
tions has also been challenged, especially regarding 
the involvement of youth, women and children — 
although this is contested by President Momis. 
Material and Symbolic Reparation
Given that there is at least some interest in consid-
ering a return to mining at Panguna under BCL, it 
is worth considering what might be expected of the 
company if it were to be invited back to Bougain-
ville. Research I have conducted in Bougainville 
suggests an expectation that the company would 
make both material and symbolic reparations for 
the contribution of mining to the Bougainville 
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conflict (McKenna 2014). For example, there is a 
strong expectation for BCL to resolve the outstand-
ing issue of 1990 compensation and rent payments. 
Despite the firmness with which compensation is 
being demanded, Bougainvilleans are also suggest-
ing that an apology and/or reconciliation with BCL 
should take place. While the ultimate aim of this 
would be to rebuild relationships, reconciliation 
would be the start of this process, not the end.
Local reconciliation efforts have been central to 
conflict resolution in Bougainville. While it is recog-
nised that the experiences of the conflict will not be 
healed overnight, there is a seeming sense of confi-
dence that if BCL were to engage in the ‘Bougainville 
way’ of reconciliation, there would be a strong foun-
dation for a new working relationship with locals.
Prospects and Obstacles
It is possible that BCL executives will want to avoid 
participation in this type of reconciliation, primari-
ly through fear that any admissions of responsibility 
might be used in litigation. However, even allowing 
for these risks, engagement in reconciliation could 
be a win-win scenario for both BCL and landown-
ers. For example, the regulatory literature suggests 
that where an apology is given, victims are less 
likely to seek redress through judicial mechanisms 
(Healy 2011:269). On the other hand, a non-judicial 
redress mechanism may be viewed by critics as an 
‘easy way out’ for a company accused of war crimes. 
An argument in favour of a process that holds 
local meaning, however, is that BCL could be in 
a better position to demonstrate awareness of the 
social and environmental damage that mining 
brought to the island. If landowners then invited 
BCL to reopen Panguna, it would send a strong 
message to both current and future shareholders 
that Bougainville copper represents a secure 
investment. For landowners, reconciliation would 
be a test for how culturally sensitive BCL would be 
if it were to reopen Panguna. 
A customary reconciliation process known 
as Bel Kol (translated as a cooling of the heart) 
between BCL, landowners, ABG, ex-combatants 
and community leaders is now under consideration. 
Consideration of this began when Paul Coleman 
(as PNG Manager for BCL) visited Buka in 2012 
and met the ABG and about 40 Panguna landowner 
representatives. Landowners said they wanted BCL 
to re-establish a presence in Bougainville to begin 
evaluation on the extent of the environmental dam-
age, to assess local community needs, as well as to 
conduct impact studies required before negotia-
tions (Momis 2014:5). The landowners decided that 
before a presence could be established, Bel Kol was 
essential. BCL agreed to this suggestion and it was 
anticipated to occur in 2014, but has since been 
delayed until after the 2015 Bougainville elections.
Conclusion
There are no guarantees that acknowledgement of 
previous errors through customary reconciliation 
practices will result in a more considered approach 
in the future. Even if BCL is invited back to Bou-
gainville and is willing to make reparations for the 
past, future harmful practices — intentional or 
otherwise — will always be a risk. There are many 
possibilities that could unfold on Bougainville as 
it approaches the referendum on independence. 
While mining companies are not generally imag-
ined as ‘peace builders’, BCL’s participation in local 
reconciliation is one of the possibilities that may 
eventuate to bring Bougainville closer to reopening 
the Panguna mine, which is seen by some as crucial 
for future economic autonomy.
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